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Then & Now: Stories of Law and Progress76
After examining the Unit-ed States Reports contain-ing the cases decided by the 
Supreme Court during its 1887–88 
term, one might conclude that the 
United States in the late 1880s was 
a law-abiding country with little 
crime. Of the approximately 270 cas-
es decided by the Court during that 
term, only seven (2.6 percent) raised 
issues of criminal law or procedure. 
In contrast, in its most recently com-
pleted term, 2011–12, the Supreme 
Court decided 76 cases, 22 (29 per-
cent) of which involved issues of 
criminal law or procedure.
What accounts for this dramatic 
rise in the number (and percentage) 
of criminal law or procedure cases 
decided by the Supreme Court? No 
one would deny that crime in the 
United States has increased since 
1888. But the true explanation for 
the increased number of criminal 
law and procedure cases decided by 
the Supreme Court is the “constitu-
tionalization” of criminal procedure. 
When originally adopted in 1791, 
the Bill of Rights (the first eight 
amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
tion) placed limitations only upon 
the Federal Government, not upon 
the individual States. Consequently, 
none of the rights provided in those 
amendments—such as the protec-
tion against unreasonable searches 
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and seizures (Fourth Amendment), 
the guarantee against double jeop-
ardy (Fifth Amendment), the privi-
lege against self-incrimination (Fifth 
Amendment), the right to counsel 
(Sixth Amendment), the right to a 
jury trial (Sixth Amendment), and 
the right to confront hostile witness-
es (Sixth Amendment)—applied in 
criminal prosecutions brought in 
state courts. Hence, an individual 
convicted of a crime in a state court 
could not challenge his or her con-
viction in the U.S. Supreme Court on 
the ground that he or she had been 
denied a right guaranteed in the Bill 
of Rights. Many states did of course 
have their own constitutional pro-
visions guaranteeing various rights 
to those accused of crime in their 
own courts, but each state could in-
terpret its own constitutional provi-
sions, and many of these provisions 
turned out to be less protective of 
individual rights than their federal 
counterparts. Moreover, since these 
were rights guaranteed by state law, 
rather than federal law, their alleged 
violation did not raise a federal issue 
that could be adjudicated by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.
Even in 1888, after the adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment—
which, among other things, prohibits 
a State from abridging the “privileg-
es and immunities” of United States 
citizens (“Privileges and Immunities 
Clause”) and from “depriving any 
person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law” (“Due 
Process Clause”)—the Bill of Rights 
still provided no protection to state 
criminal defendants.
Shortly after the turn of the twen-
tieth century, the Supreme Court 
recognized that the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected some individual 
rights from state infringement, in-
cluding, perhaps, some safeguarded 
by the Bill of Rights against National 
action. Nevertheless, the Court ex-
pressly stated that if the Due Process 
Clause protected such latter rights, it 
was not because they were enumer-
ated in the first eight amendments. 
It explained that the Due Process 
Clause protected only those rights 
that are “the very essence of a scheme 
of ordered liberty” and essential to “a 
fair and enlightened system of jus-
tice.” In determining whether a par-
ticular safeguard met this standard, 
the Court asked whether “a civi-
lized system could be imagined that 
would not accord the particular pro-
tection.” Applying this test, the Su-
preme Court held that several of the 
protections contained in the Bill of 
Rights, including the privilege against 
self-incrimination and the right to a 
grand jury indictment, did not apply 
to the States. Even when the Court 
held that a particular right enumerated 
in the Bill of Rights fell within the 
concept of due process, it frequently 
concluded that the protection afford-
ed against state infringement was less 
than that afforded against infringe-
ment by the Federal Government—a 
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“watered-down” version of the right.
To illustrate, although the Fifth 
Amendment guarantee against 
double jeopardy precluded the 
Government in a federal criminal 
prosecution from appealing a jury 
verdict—whether a conviction or 
an acquittal—that protection did 
not apply in state court proceedings. 
Consequently, in the mid-1930s, 
after a Connecticut jury consider-
ing a charge of first-degree murder 
against Frank Palko convicted him 
of second-degree murder (thereby 
implicitly acquitting him of the orig-
inal charge of first-degree murder), 
the State, acting pursuant to a state 
statute, sought review of the con-
viction. The State claimed the trial 
judge had erred in instructing the 
jury on first-degree murder and in 
excluding certain evidence from the 
prosecution’s case. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court agreed; it reversed 
the conviction (and life sentence) 
and, despite Palko’s implicit acquittal 
for that offense, ordered a new trial 
for first-degree murder. At the sec-
ond trial, a jury convicted Palko of 
first-degree murder, and he was sen-
tenced to death—a conviction and 
sentence that the Supreme Court ul-
timately upheld against a claim that 
Palko’s second trial had placed him 
twice in jeopardy for first-degree 
murder.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, the Supreme Court consistently 
rejected the view, persuasively ar-
gued by Justice Hugo L. Black, that 
the Fourteenth Amendment had “in-
corporated” the entire Bill of Rights 
and made its provisions applicable to 
the States to the same extent as they 
applied to the Federal Government. 
Even as late as 1961, despite the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee that 
an accused in a criminal prosecu-
tion “shall enjoy the right . . . to have 
the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defense,” an indigent being tried in 
a state court for a non-capital felony 
had no federal constitutional right to 
have counsel appointed to represent 
him or her. Thus, when Clarence 
Earl Gideon, an indigent drifter be-
ing tried in a Florida state court for 
breaking and entering a poolroom, 
requested the trial court to appoint 
counsel to represent him, the judge 
could respond:
Photo of Clarence Earl Gideon, 1961(?), State Ar-
chives of Florida, Florida Memory, RC12789.
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Mr. Gideon, I am sorry, but I can-
not appoint Counsel to represent 
you in this case. Under the laws of 
the State of Florida, the only time 
the Court can appoint Counsel to 
represent a Defendant is when that 
person is charged with a capital of-
fense. I am sorry, but I will have 
to deny your request to appoint 
Counsel to defend you in this case.
During the 1960s, however, un-
der the leadership of Chief Justice 
Earl Warren, the Supreme Court 
adopted the position that the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment “selectively incorporat-
ed” various provisions of the Bill of 
Rights and made them applicable to 
the States. Using this approach, the 
Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimi-
nation, the Fifth Amendment guar-
antee against double jeopardy, the 
Sixth Amendment right to a jury 
trial, and, in overturning Clarence 
Earl Gideon’s conviction, the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel were 
among the rights safeguarded from 
infringement by the states. In 1968, 
the Court explained that it had re-
formulated its test for determining 
whether a particular provision of 
the Bill of Rights was incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. It 
stated:
The recent cases . . . have pro-
ceeded upon the valid assump-
tion that state criminal processes 
are not imaginary and theoretical 
schemes but actual systems bearing 
virtually every characteristic of the 
common-law system that has been 
developing virtually contemporane-
ously in England and in this country. 
The question thus is whether given 
this kind of system a particular pro-
cedure is fundamental—whether, 
that is, a procedure is necessary to 
an Anglo-American regime of or-
dered liberty. [Emphasis added.]
Today, virtually all of the provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights safeguard-
ing the rights of a criminal defen-
dant apply to the States (the lone 
exception being the right to an in-
dictment). As a result, the Supreme 
Court each term receives hundreds 
of petitions requesting it to review 
a state-court conviction alleged to 
have been obtained in violation of 
the defendant’s federal constitutional 
rights, and each year the Court de-
cides 20 or so cases involving such 
issues, a large percentage of the 
number of cases it decides each term 
with written opinions. ◆
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